Wax figurine tableau of the 1984 meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Margaret Thatcher, 69th floor, Diwang Building. The tableau clearly articulates the idea of ‘Shen Kong’ and its ideological underpinning the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty.

As an adjective, ‘Shen Kong’ refers to Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and the former colony of Hong Kong – a geopolitical referent that invokes Mandarin and Anglo-Cantonese cultural identities. In fact, the end of the colonial era has been one of the most important ideological referents for Shenzhen identity. On the sixty-ninth floor of the Diwang (地王, literally Land King) Building, for example, is a photo gallery and Lan Kwai Fong-style eatery to commemorate Hong Kong’s return. In this obviously dated tableau, wax figures of Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping sit next to each other, anticipating the vindication of the Opium Wars, gunboat diplomacy, and Britain’s colonial legacy in south China. Likewise, in Nantou there are anti-opium exhibits, and the Shenzhen City Museum dedicates a large section to anti-colonial installations.

In fact, until 1997, Shenzhen residents eagerly anticipated the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty (回归), and erected buildings and neighbourhoods that were literally called Shen Kong (深港). Nevertheless, even as the importance of the handover has faded and Shenzhen and Hong Kong have continued to negotiate border protocols and levels of integration, so too the meaning of Shen Kong has continued to shift.

This chapter unpacks some of the key moments in the ongoing construction, dismantling, and repurposing of the Shenzhen–Hong Kong border, with an eye towards understanding the complex relationships between the cartographic border (with its checkpoints...
Shen Kung’s Prehistory: The Bao’an Frontier Defence Zone

The cartographic border that defines Shen Kong dates back to 1898, when the Sino-British border was redrawn along the Shenzhen River and extended west (towards Shatoujiao) and east (dividing Deep Bay into Chinese and British sections). In 1914, the British opened the Kowloon Canton Railway (KCR). Within Bao’an County, KCR stations passed through Weitou-speaking Shenzhen Market and Hakka-speaking Buji before entering Cantonese Dongguan, effectively bypassing traditional trade routes along the Pearl River. The border remained free and open until the Korean War, when Great Britain allied with the United States. The border was closed in July 1950, and on October 15, 1951, the Chinese central government announced the establishment of a Frontier Defence Zone (边防区) along the border, which comprised a series of checkpoints and increasing levels of security clearance. A frontier pass (边防通行证) was necessary to enter the northern section of the Defence Zone. An exception pass (特许证) allowed the holder to pass through the next checkpoint to enter the restricted area (禁区). The military cordon (警戒线) was established within fifty to one hundred metres of the border, which was itself designated the highest-level military cordon (最高警戒区).

Chen Bing’an identifies the Defence Zone borders as: Dapeng Bay in the east, the Shenzhen River in the south, Mzaou River in the west, and Shaxia in the north. Conversations with older locals, however, suggest that the northern border of the Defence Zone might not have been as far north as Shaxia. An older gentleman remembered that the northern boundary of the Frontier Defence Zone coincided with Luoshia Road, which used to be a Frontier Defence Road between Shatoujiao and Lianhua. He was not sure, however, how the line extended west, positing that it might have followed the coast until Qianhai – suggesting that although the Frontier Defence Zone occupied more territory than the original Special Zone, nevertheless it functioned as a strategic buffer zone between Hong Kong and China. Older residents’ vagueness about the exact borders of the Defence Zone, as well as their regulated access to Hong Kong, remind us that throughout the Cold War, the Sino-British border (as well as the Sino-Portuguese border at Zhuhai and the Taiwan Straits) was not treated in the same way as China’s other borders, which were drawn and enforced to secure political stability in areas inhabited by non-Han populations. Instead, Chinese leaders consistently deployed the Sino-British border as an instrument of domestic development and as a site for adjusting Chinese foreign policy.

In 1953, the Bao’an County seat was moved from Nantou (on the Pearl River) to Caiwuiwei (next to the Luohu checkpoint and Shenzhen Market). This new location allowed the government both to administer the Bao’an Frontier Defence Zone and to regulate cross-border flows of water and agricultural products (from Bao’an to Hong Kong) and inflows of hard currency (from Hong Kong to Bao’an), making the border a key element in domestic governance. In 1957, for example, Zhou Enlai publicly stated that Hong Kong should remain a free port with connections to other ports in order to train talents as a means of ‘turn(ing) disadvantages into advantages’ for China’s long-term development. There was no question that Hong Kong was and would remain Chinese and that the colonial status quo was part of a ‘serve our need’ strategy, delaying the return of Hong Kong until ‘the time was ripe’.

To achieve this long-term goal, the Chinese government pursued cross-border infrastructural integration through initiatives such as the East River Shenzhen Waterworks Project, which stabilised living conditions in Hong Kong while putting increased pressure on Bao’an residents. Between 1958 and 1964, for example, Bao’an communes deployed young workers to meet both agricultural production quotas and waterworks construction deadlines, resulting in widespread sleep deprivation. One villager remembered that, ‘at the time, all young workers battled day and night, there were no machines to excavate, and we carried baskets of soil on our shoulders, wearing out our clothes and chafing our shoulders. We ate and lived on the construction sites and only slept three to five hours at night.’ Once Hong Kong’s water situation had stabilised, the colony’s industrialisation initiatives resulted in growing discrepancies between the relative standards of living on the two sides of the border.

A series of responses to the famine that resulted from the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) further illustrates that border regulations in Bao’an County were persistently adjusted to regulate both domestic and international problems. In 1961, Guangdong Province implemented the ‘three flies’ policy. The three flies were: every month, Bao’an residents could go to Hong Kong up to five times; the goods that they brought into Hong Kong to sell could not be worth more than five rmb; and goods they brought back couldn’t weigh more than 5 jin (2.5 kilos) or value more than five rmb. The result allowed goods to travel back and forth across the border, achieving the larger goal of frontier stability. However, in 1962, when it became clear that neither the British in Hong Kong nor the Nationalists in Taiwan could handle the number of fleeing refugees (estimated at 200,000 in three years), the border was increasingly tightened, and small-scale cross-border commerce became more difficult, but not impossible.
The strategic use of the Sino-British border during the Cold War anticipated the emergence of post-Mao Shen Kong in two important ways.

First, Bao’an County was segregated into two sections, with locals living within the Frontier Defence Area having privileged access to Hong Kong. Shatojuiao, Luofang, and Yumin villages, for example, lay within the restricted area, and even local Bao’an residents needed to apply for an exception pass to cross. In addition, thirty-one Bao’an border villages had land claims of up to 3,616 mu (241 hectares) of arable land in the New Territories, while New Territory villages claimed 402 mu (26.8 hectares) of arable land in Bao’an. Along the border, some two thousand villagers from at least thirty-one natural villages were issued cross-border farming passes (耕作证). Local fishing villages also continued to operate in shared waters, including the Shenzhen River. In fact, throughout the Cold War, Bao’an County also supplied fish to Hong Kong, as well as vegetables, poultry, pork, and even grasshoppers (蚂蚱), which became deep-fried treats.

Second, both the national government and local people deployed the border to achieve specific goals. When those goals were not in conflict with each other, border regulations were loosely enforced. However, when the goals of individuals came into conflict with national goals, border regulations for Chinese citizens would be more strictly enforced to achieve national goals, such as the stability of Hong Kong. Between 1950 and 1980, both the British and Chinese governments increasingly enforced the segregation. In turn, governing Bao’an—especially the Frontier Defence Zone—hinged on balancing the demands of national policy and the relative accessibility of Hong Kong. Bao’an cadres were expected to prevent villagers from permanently fleeing to Hong Kong, even when—in the words of one border native—‘only the incompetent couldn’t make it across’ and ‘women practised swimming so that they could cross into Hong Kong and find husbands’.

Susan Buck-Morss contends that within Communist countries, history became the medium of progress towards socialism, such that immediate geopolitical concerns could be delayed in order to advance industrial development; the point was to develop as quickly as possible in order to achieve necessary conditions for the establishment of international Communism. In other words, from the perspective of the state, the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty could be delayed for as much time as was deemed necessary to build a strong China, both politically and economically. Nevertheless, Mao’s ideal of ‘permanent revolution’ or ‘continuous revolution’ as the means by which Chinese society could advance quickly often resulted in social upheavals that made everyday life precarious, and so Bao’an farmers (and others in the region) continued to flee to Hong Kong. The emergence of the idea of ‘Hong Kong believer’ in 1971 catalysed the consolidation of a local identity that operated within and against the idea of ‘China’ even as Bao’an locals continued to cross into Hong Kong and establish residency there. Thus, in the separation and delayed return, in Cold War definitions of this bloc and that, in the organisation of border patrols and the construction of cross-border infrastructure, differences proliferated and new identities emerged north and south of the Shenzhen River.

IMMIGRANT SHEN KONG: THE SPECIAL ZONE

After coming to power in 1978, Deng Xiaoping pushed forward Reform and Opening because he understood that the economic gap between China and the developed world had political implications. Indeed, he maintained that migration from Bao’an to Hong Kong was a result of poor policies that could only be curtailed by improving the general standard of living on the Chinese side of the border. In other words, from the point of view of the Chinese state, the establishment of the Special Zone was a pragmatic response to a political problem.

In 1979, Bao’an County was elevated to Shenzhen Municipality, and in 1980 the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone was created within its borders. The earliest urban plans for the Special Zone built upon Bao’an County’s extant Cold War network of cross-border integration, specifically at the Luohu railway station and Wenjingdu shipping checkpoint. Key landmarks included the Baguaing and Shangu (Huaqiangbei) Industrial Parks, the Dongmen market areas, and Luohu Commercial City, as well as the Yuanling, Bashaling, and Binhe Estates and public institutions such as the Grand Theatre and the Museum of Science and Technology. Well into the new millennium, this area was known as ‘downtown’ or, more simply, ‘Shenzhen’. West of the Shanghai Hotel were Shenzhen’s suburbs, where the city authorised commercial poultry farming and recreational areas, such as the Honey Lake Resort, which boasted a castle, a roller coaster, and a diversity of dining experiences. Vast distance separated downtown Shenzhen from its suburbs; Old Shenzheners often travelled two hours (one way) on winding dirt roads to enjoy a day off relaxing at Honey Lake.

Experimental construction of the city system accompanied early adjustments to the border regime, with provisions for ‘companion’ capital to bring manufacturing to Shenzhen. From 1980 to 2000, for example, conservative estimates suggested that 70% of direct foreign investment in Shenzhen came from Hong Kong, and that investment in Shenzhen made up 30% of Hong Kong investment in the Mainland. Economically, it was a successful strategy. Through Hong Kong, Shenzhen secured access to global markets, while via Shenzhen, Hong Kong manufacturers were able to expand despite labour shortages, rising production costs, and growing competition from other East and Southeast Asian economies by displacing manufacturing to Shenzhen. Moreover, the proximity of the two cities allowed Hong Kong investors to achieve a remarkable advantage.
advantage because they did not have to finance an expatriate staff to oversee their investments; in other words, Hong Kong investors enjoyed the benefits of overseas investing without the costs of actually going overseas and having to hire a support staff. These savings came to as much as a quarter million dollars per year per expatriate. Locally, this cross-border strategy of graded access to value was known as ‘store in front, factory in back (前店后厂)’. Shenzhen intensified these border effects by constructing its own internal border, the second line (二线), which functioned analogously to the Shenzhen–Hong Kong border: capital could cross the border in either direction, but workers – even the young, educated professionals from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou – needed border passes to enter the Special Zone, creating a wide range of possible social identities, which were broadly classified as Shenzhener, local, and migrant.

The city’s first generation of immigrants, the so-called ‘Old Shenzheners’, built and lived in Luohu, their children attending nearby elementary schools and then taking tests to attend either Shenzhen Middle School or Shenzhen Experimental. Old Shenzheners were urban-to-urban migrants who had professional and social goals. Most took first jobs that paid better but were of lower status than their home town jobs. What’s more, like Deng Xiaoping, many Old Shenzheners were idealists who hoped to fix what had gone wrong in China’s cities during the Cultural Revolution. In 1982, for example, Teacher Chu left her job at Zhongshan University, where she taught Marxist economics, in order to work as a secretary in a Shenzhen construction company. At the time, there were no dorms for women, no televisions, and no private telephones, luxuries that, as a university professor, she had enjoyed in Guangzhou. Important news, such as the death of a beloved grandmother, came by telegraph. Nevertheless, Teacher Chu came ‘in order to do something’. Another friend once explained that when she first came to Shenzhen in 1983, there was something special about the people as they figured out how to be ‘modern’ and ‘international’ in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.

For Old Shenzheners, Shen Kong assumed vexed cultural significance for two interrelated reasons. On the one hand, Hong Kong was held up as an example of a modern city. Old Shenzheners were familiar with Hong Kong architecture, popular music, and fashion. They directly adopted Hong Kong expressions such as ‘husband (老公)’ and ‘pretty woman (靓女)’ into their Mandarin vocabularies, while younger migrants learned Cantonese by watching Hong Kong television programmes and singing Canto-pop karaoke. They also worked with the first generation of Hong Kong investors, who by and large did not speak Mandarin, expecting their employees to learn Cantonese.

In addition, Luohu’s extensive commercial areas simultaneously catered to Hong Kong people seeking cheap products and entertainment and Mainland people seeking to purchase imported goods (Dongmen). Many Old Shenzheners have said that if the early Special Zone had a culture, it came via Hong Kong rather than Guangzhou.

On the other hand, the Special Zone ‘store in front, factory in back’ model of development presupposed an enforceable border, such that workers on the Chinese side of the border could not work in Hong Kong (where salaries and wages were often ten times higher), even as Hong Kong capital easily operated within Shenzhen. Unlike Hong Kong people, who could easily enter the Special Zone on the basis of their identity cards, Shenzhen residents could not readily enter Hong Kong (with the exception of Bao’an locals who maintained cross-border passes from the previous decades). This enforced inequality meant that many cross-border jobs entailed catering to the cultural habits and desires of Hong Kong businessmen, who often visited spas for massage, partied in local bars with hostesses, and set up second wives – activities that were more strictly regulated outside the Special Zone in both the Mainland and Hong Kong. In this sense, Old Shenzheners have also viewed Hong Kong as a place where relative wealth allowed for arrogance and lax morality.

INDIGENOUS SHEN KONG: TRANSFORMING THE VILLAGES

The transfer of agricultural lands from Bao’an collectives to urban work units precipitated the construction of the early Special Zone in Luohu and Shangbu. In practice, this meant that urban ministries or provincial institutions would propose a plan to construct a factory area and worker housing. Once approved, institutional representatives negotiated compensation packages with a local village to transfer
necessary tracts of land from the collective to the state. During the 1980s, this piecemeal process benefited villages in Luohu and Shangdong, which used compensation money as seed capital for collective enterprises that included constructing industrial parks, selling agricultural products in Hong Kong, and organising the import of Hong Kong goods to sell in village markets. The most famous of these early new villages was Luohu’s Fishing Yumincun (漁民村), which Deng Xiaoping visited in 1984 on the tour that justified the extension of Reform and Opening policies into China’s coastal cities.

In 1990, the Shenzhen government reorganised, promoting a more comprehensive vision for the development of the Special Zone. To this end, in 1991 Shenzhen initiated the rural urbanisation movement (農村城市化運動), appropriating all village lands within the Special Zone into the state apparatus and changing villagers’ hukou status from Bao’an to Shenzhen. This ‘double transformation’ facilitated the Special Zone’s westward expansion from its epicentre in Luohu into Futian (formerly called Shangbu), as it allowed for more comprehensive planning. The reconstituted villages were integrated into the municipal apparatus as neighbourhoods (居委会, juweihui), which have been the basic administrative unit of Chinese cities. However, to provide villages with post-agricultural livelihoods, the government compensation had two components: the establishment of collective limited companies (股份公司) and individual housing plots (宅基地, zaijididi). The result was a transitional urban typology between China’s urban and rural sectors – the new village, where the government owned the land but a corporate village not only managed the property holdings of an entire neighbourhood but also provided some welfare services, such as water and electricity. Membership in the village corporation was hereditary with respect to traditional genealogies.

New villages were complex, semi-formal entities that comprised collectively held factories and housing estates, privately held rental properties, and public areas, including streets and plazas. Importantly, there was no truly alienable property within a village. Village men could apply to the village company for housing plots to construct houses for themselves, children, and potential grandchildren. Children could inherit their father’s building(s); however, only the village corporation could sell buildings to non-villagers. The government had agreed to allow villagers to build private homes in the expectation that they would build 2.5-storey family homes on hundred-square-metre plots. Instead, villagers built six- to eight-storey (sometimes higher) rental properties that became their primary source of income. These buildings were constructed so close to each other that it was possible for residents to reach out through their windows and shake hands with their neighbours; they became colloquially known as ‘handshakes (握手楼)’. In addition, village corporations assumed responsibility for organising holiday activities, the maintenance of ancestral halls and temples, and the upkeep of public spaces, including public plazas, small park areas, and exercise stations.

21 Shenzhen reorganised its neighbourhoods and villages into communities (社区, shequ) through a protracted process of establishing community centres throughout the city between 2005 and 2010, and then integrating community and neighbourhood offices in 2011. See Mary Ann O’Donnell & Viola Yan Wan Shen Kong: Cui Bono? (trans. 2011), which has been the basic administrative unit of Chinese cities.

22 For a detailed examination of the implications of the rise and redevelopment of Gangxia, see reTumu Urban/Rural Institute, Gangxia Max Rekonen (98 ‘剛下羅生門’), Shenzhen: reTumu Urban/Rural Institute, December 2015.
to 1999, Shenzhen’s official population grew from 1.68 million to 6.33 million, while unofficial estimates suggested the actual population could have been as high as ten million. As Shenzhen’s population boomed, new villages provided not only basic housing but also unregistered schools and clinics for migrants. By the mid-1990s, new villages served both urban-to-rural and rural-to-urban migrants as their gateway to the Special Zone.

NATIVE SHEN KONG: THE SECOND GENERATION

During the 1980s, ‘Shen Kong’ referred to two different ways of relating to Hong Kong. Old Shenzheners approached Hong Kong through the narratives of modernisation and internationalisation, but could not freely cross the border. Bao’an locals experienced Hong Kong as an estranged homeland to which they had had continuous, albeit regulated, access. This selective regulation of the border facilitated rural urbanisation and the transition from the Bao’an Frontier Zone to the Special Zone. In the 1990s, Shenzhen’s population boom and concomitant construction of new villages not only changed the landscape but enabled low-cost, rapid urbanisation precisely because the villages accommodated large populations at no expense to the government. In other words, in the twenty years after the establishment of Shenzhen, Shen Kong facilitated the transition from Bao’an to the Special Zone by providing a framework for negotiating the historic fallout of domestic policies within and against Cold War realpolitik.

In the decade following 2000, the central government began to liberalise restrictions on the Shenzhen–Hong Kong border and Shenzhen’s internal border (the second line). In 2003, promulgation of the Individual Visit Scheme allowed for Mainland Chinese to visit Hong Kong independently, rather than only on a tour visa. In 2009, the adoption of M-Permits allowed Shenzhen residents to move easily between the two cities. These changes to regulation of the border reflected changing understandings of Shen Kong.

Shen Kong textbooks and wearing a common citywide uniform. In contrast, elsewhere in China, English lessons began much later and each school had its own uniform. Shen 2s made excursions to Honey Lake when it was far away, have visceral memories of lining up to buy hamburgers and French fries at China’s first McDonald’s in Dongmen, and frequently visit Hong Kong. Most grew up speaking both standard Mandarin and Cantonese. Indeed, unlike their parents and latter-day migrants, Shen 2s embody the multiplicities of Shen Kong: they are as interested in Shenzhen’s pre-1980 history as they are in Hong Kong street life and crossing the border to watch movies that have been banned in China.

Not surprisingly, class differences within the Shen 2 generation reflect their parents’ gradated access to the Special Zone and Hong Kong years ago. Shen 2s who grew up in Luohu when it was still colloquially known as Shenzhen have an untroubled identification with the city. In contrast, a sense of estrangement vexes Shen 2s who grew up outside the second line. These Shen 2s remember sneaking across the border to visit ‘Shenzhen’ on special occasions. Similarly, the children of Bao’an locals are aware that Old Shenzheners and their children have occupied traditional landholdings, and the question of injustice lingers: why should they benefit from our land when we did not? What’s more, many Hakka Shen 2s worry that their children (like their young cousins) will not speak Hakka. Meanwhile, the children of migrants without Shenzhen household residency have grappled less with problems of cultural identity than they have with the practical necessity of securing legal rights to the city through a Shenzhen hukou.

As Shenzhen entered its fourth decade, questions about legal rights to the city became even more pressing. This question has had two interrelated components. The first is the right to affordable housing within or near Luohu and Futian, which remain the city’s political, economic, and cultural centre. The second is the hukou rights for the children of permanent residents. Importantly, both of these questions reflected changing understandings of Shen Kong.

Firstly, accelerating urbanisation in Luohu and Futian surrounded and dwarfed the new villages, giving rise to the expression ‘villages-in-the-city’ (城中村, chengzhongcun) or urban village. When Shenzhen announced its urban renewal policy in 2007, urban villages were considered ‘dirty, chaotic, and substandard (烂乱差)’, in part because of their population density. Indeed, the expression ‘urban village’ functioned synonymously with ‘slum’. Recent urban renewal projects have targeted the villages, especially along the Shenzhen–Hong Kong border. The demolitions of Caixiuwei and Gangxia, for example, displaced as many as 100,000 people per village from Luohu and Futian respectively. Even more importantly, the demolitions have destroyed not only inexpensive housing options but also low-capital venues for start-up, small-scale companies and ‘mom-and-pop’ stores. Indeed, with explicit government support, developers have transformed Shenzhen’s traditional gateways into high-end housing...
and commercial and business areas, hardening the city’s class structure and effectively limiting general access to Shen Kong, which used to be available to immigrants via the villages.

Secondly, during the 2000s, immigration had slowed but not stopped, and by the end of 2015 the city’s administrative population had reached 20 million people. To keep pace, Shenzhen has liberalised its household registration laws, and inhabitants with permanent residency and their children have increasingly enjoyed social welfare, including the right to compulsory education in Shenzhen rather than in their home town. Indeed, the primary task of schools whose population comprises the children of permanent residents is to secure test results that will allow students to stay in Shenzhen for high school, with the expectation that they can then easily enter college. These schools are mostly located in Shenzhen’s suburban districts. Consequently, members of this Shen 2 cohort do not speak Cantonese fluently or, when they do, prefer to speak Mandarin largely because they have been excluded from Shen Kong, growing up in overwhelmingly Mandarin-speaking environments and denied permits to travel to Hong Kong.

Thirdly, the establishment of the Qianhai Hong Kong Modern Service Cooperation Zone (前海深港现代服务业合作区) aims to institutionalise on Shenzhen territory financial and legal instruments that are currently located in Hong Kong. Geographically, the Qianhai area includes Shekou and Xixiang, straddling the former second line, emphasising the emergence of Shenzhen (as opposed to the Special Zone). Qianhai represents the latest phase in the ongoing deterritorialisation and re-embedding of the Shenzhen–Hong Kong border to achieve national goals. Qianhai is part of the larger ‘One Belt, One Road (一带一路)’ initiative to lay a ‘new Silk Road’ that will allow China to capture higher levels of value from production not only in the Pearl River Delta but also beyond its geographical borders.

SHEN KONG: CUI BONO?

On the face of it, Shenzhen seems securely placed just north of Hong Kong. We say ‘Shen Kong’ without questioning its referent because even if its ancient no longer exists, Shenzhen and Hong Kong did compose an older whole – Xin’an. This imagined totality grounds Shen Kong, transforming the border from an instrument of absolute exclusion into ‘an apparatus for calibrating people in conjunction with capital, goods, and natural elements such as water (and increasingly air)’.

At second glance, however, the expression ‘Shen Kong’ forcefully reminds us that the border has been repeatedly appropriated by distinct levels of government, by differently positioned capitalists, and by diverse actors to achieve a wide range of intentions. The border does not partition Shenzhen and Hong Kong so much as it has allowed for ongoing regulation of differences within the region. Simply put, there is no single Shen Kong but a myriad of Shen Kongs, which are constantly in play even as handover ceremonies, waterworks, and border-crossing protocols attempt to stabilise the assertion that Shenzhen and Hong Kong are discrete cities. Indeed, if the history of Shen Kong teaches us anything, perhaps it is simply this: within the current iteration of the world system, borders enable the calibration, management, and control of adjacent territories with relation to each other as if they were geographically isolated, even as they administratively suture geographically distant areas (such as Beijing and Hong Kong) into coherent geopolitical assemblages.

In April 2015, the central government tightened the border against Shenzhen residents, limiting visiting rights from unlimited to once weekly. For individuals, this may produce some inconvenience, but by and large this decision was taken – as have been previous decisions – to stabilise the border and promote state interests.